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The Nuremberg IMT is usually thought to have performed a didactic function in 
part, as a kind of show trial.1 Given that the world public could not be in the 
courtroom, journalism had a key role to play in drawing lessons from the evidence. 
The largest group of journalists and writers ever gathered in one place to cover one 
event: over one hundred and sixty writers,2 as well as the artists and filmmakers who 
represented what happened there, all had a crucial role to play in mediating and 
distilling the lessons to be drawn from the nine month-long proceedings. While their 
interpretations have been supplemented and superseded by subsequent writings, 
memoirs and histories, as well as films, these contemporary journalistic reports played 
a crucial role in the struggle between competing understandings of the trial and the 
war.  
The tension was a confrontation not only between those on trial and those trying 
them, but also between the victor nations administering justice. As discussed above 
(see Chapter Five), this encompassed the legal debates about what was or was not to 
be presented in the courtroom, and the roles of the various legal teams, and the many 
conflicts beneath the surface impression of common endeavour undertaken by United 
Nations, anticipated the emerging Cold War,3 or were its opening battle as the tribunal 
itself and the reporting of it became ‘the site and the subject of an immense 
propaganda struggle’.4 
In Western historiography, the USA is widely thought to have won the battle, so 
that the hegemonic view of the IMT may be summed up as ‘a tale of liberal triumph’ 
and ‘a devastating propaganda failure’ for the Soviets.5 This view has prevailed to 
such an extent that Western accounts often side-line the Soviets, whose presence 
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inconveniently undermined the legal value of the trial, also introducing hard to 
pronounce names and difficult to understand motives.6 Such an approach distorts the 
picture by treating the Soviets’ marginalization as a forgone conclusion, and largely 
silences the alternative Soviet account of the war and approach to the IMT that failed 
to gain hegemonic status. This simplification, in addition to reading the events 
through the distorting lens of their outcome, also underplays the Soviets’ pivotal role 
in setting up the trial, and the significance of the evidence revealed by them, while 
simultaneously assuming the irrelevance of the Soviets’ attempts to interpret the 
proceedings in line with their own emerging narrative of the war.7 
Yet by defining and examining the evolution and distinct character of the Soviet 
account we can better understand not only why it failed and the Western account 
prevailed, but also grasp the extent to which it had merits and emphases missing from 
the dominant view of the IMT, some of which remain relevant to understanding 
Nazism and the Holocaust. 
In broad terms the contemporary Soviet account of the IMT followed the formula 
of ‘Russian exceptionalism, heroism and victimization’ emphasizing the importance 
of the Soviet, and implicitly Russian, role in defeating the Nazis, of the suffering 
inflicted by the Nazis specifically on the Soviet people and talking up the Soviet role 
in the trial.8 Yet, despite the fact that all Soviet journalism underwent a process of 
preliminary censor’s scrutiny to ensure unanimity on the overall narrative, a key 
distinguishing feature of the Soviet coverage, when compared with that of the 
American or British journalists, is that those covering the trial had far more 
experience as eyewitnesses of the most brutal of Nazi atrocities. The result was that, 
despite Soviet attempts to vet, centralize and standardize reporting, the tendency of a 
number of recent accounts of Soviet wartime journalism taken as a whole, when we 
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look at the detail of specific articles and personalities, we see there are instances 
where individual reporters strove to retain their distinct voices and echo their personal 
histories. They necessarily refracted their courtroom perceptions not only through the 
overarching Soviet template and conventions for understanding the Nazis and the war, 
but also attempted to convey their own specific wartime positions as eyewitnesses to 
the immediate aftermath of Nazi mass murder, including the Holocaust.9 Of particular 
interest here is the Soviet writer and journalist Boris Polevoi in part because he was 
one of the only two Soviet journalists to publish an eyewitness account of Auschwitz 
on its liberation, at least in the central press, but also because he reworked that 
account in his reporting of the trial and again in his subsequent diaries and memoirs. 
The shifting emphases between these accounts are evident from a comparison of the 
different pieces by the same author on the same subject. 
A further factor counteracting the homogenizing thrust of the Soviet leadership 
was that their own views on many of the issues were changing fast. Thus, the place of 
the war in the Soviet imaginary was shifting from the wartime patterns of 
representation and still unclear: the war had unleashed a ‘plurality of narratives and 
actors’ in the Soviet media, which could not be readjusted and standardized 
overnight.10 Thus, journalists’ personal investments and the not yet fixed Soviet 
narrative on the war and Holocaust make Soviet journalistic coverage of the 
Nuremberg tribunal distinct, heterogeneous and a rewarding object for analysis. 
Conveying the Soviet Narrative 
The American prosecution team set out to steal everyone else’s thunder at the 
courtroom itself, and ensure they played the central role, achieving this through a 
broad interpretation of the ‘conspiracy’ charge that meant using many of the 
documents supplied to them by the French, British and the Russians. This was part of 
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a deliberate and largely successful attempt to keep ‘the bulk of the case in American 
hands.’11 Consequently other teams had good reason to be worried that this would 
make their interventions less dramatic and less telling, and they ultimately ended up 
repeating some of what the Americans had done, rather than cut down their cases, and 
this prolonged the trial needlessly.12 Necessarily, the first iteration of the Nazis’ 
crimes was of greater interest than the subsequent ones, which presented the Soviet 
press with a difficult task: the Soviet narrative of the war cast the Soviet Union as the 
main character, and so Soviet coverage had to find a way to make the Soviets central, 
and overcome, at least to the satisfaction of domestic readers, the Americans’ 
upstaging of them.13  
First, however, Soviet journalists had to adapt their established wartime templates 
for understanding Nazism to the actual Nazi leaders physically present in front of 
them. In the first weeks of the trial particularly, it was the defendants themselves who 
attracted the most coverage, especially Göring, the ‘Nazi number two,’ and Hess, for 
his simulated memory loss. Even the American prison psychologist was writing a 
book intended from the outset as a scoop on the subject.14  
The same fascination was evident in Soviet journalistic accounts. Yet, while they 
made some attempts to analyse the inner workings of the Nazi defendants, they were 
hampered by their established habits of representing the Nazi leaders in highly 
effective wartime caricatures. Seeing these people in the flesh forced a reappraisal of 
such portrayals: Polevoi was not alone in being struck by a sense that that Göring was 
not like his caricatures.15 As journalist and documentary filmmaker, Roman Karmen 
commented, cartoonists Boris Efimov and the Kukryniksy triumvirate of artists now 
had an opportunity to revise their caricatures: 
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… for many years their sharp pencils and brushes have represented this band of 
Fascist leaders on caricatures and posters. Now for the first time they are drawing 
them from nature…16 
 
Yet Efimov’s cartoons continued the old habit of depicting the top Nazis as 
abnormal and monstrous. In a series entitled ‘The Fascist Menagerie’ Göring is 
depicted as a snake, Keitel as a jackal followed by a whole series of bestialized 
defendants.17 Likewise, the Kukryniksys’ series of portraits of the defendants, used in 
pairs to accompany brief articles by writer Vsevolod Vishnevskii devoted to each of 
the defendants, emphasize Göring as cruel and greedy by showing him to be 
enormous and fleshy, in an echo of the classic early Bolshevik representations of 
capitalists as porcine. For grotesquely comic contrast, he is portrayed alongside an 
exaggeratedly skinny Hess.18 The combination of the Kukryniksys’ caricatures and 
Vishnevskii’s sketches do not always work well, since the grotesque mode is most 
effective when accompanied by a character sketch, but elsewhere Vishnevskii gives a 
biography and list of the crimes committed, which suggest these were the crimes of an 
inhuman system, rather than those of an exceptional individual. 
One Soviet artist who attempted to depart from the established hyperbolic 
depictions was Nikolai Zhukov, whose sketches of the defendants strove to suggest 
moral corruption in a subtler, realist manner, as opposed to the Kukryniksy and 
Efimov): 
 
When I looked from the figure of the chair of the court to the dock, I particularly felt 
their insignificance. They were not wearing prison clothes, they sat in their suits and 
ties, and in this they differed little from other people, and yet their Fascist essence, 
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despite this, was clearly evident. Maybe people will think I’m biased, but I’m 
convinced that a truthful, realistic, successful drawing can in this case be more 
expressive in its damning force than caricature, because caricature is the hyperbolic 
use of physical shortcomings, extending them to the point they become funny. In such 
cases you never know what percentage of truth there is in this and how much artistic 
transformation. The Fascist criminals’ appearance is such that an accurate copy of 
them was also the essence of their most unpleasant and negative character traits, 
whereas any exaggeration would be too much and a deviation from artistic truth. I 
could feel this intensely when I looked at the likes of Kaltenbrunner, Streicher, Hess 
etc.19 
 
Zhukov’s more subtle pencil drawings add literal and figurative shades of grey, 
suggesting an attempt to turn away from exceptional and monstrous portrayals, and to 
come to a more rounded appraisal of what the Nazis were, and how they came to do 
the things they did. The trial itself, through the conspiracy charge in particular, 
suggested an understanding of the individuals on trial as representatives of various 
organizations, i.e. of the Nazi state’s component parts. Zhukov echoes the shift 
towards a sense of the unexceptional nature of the accused, which went together with 
an exploration of Nazism as a system.20 
This reorientation had been present in Soviet coverage of the trial from the outset, 
that is, as early in proceedings as Pravda’s leading article on the day the indictment 
was published in October 1945, which argued that it was not just individuals on trial 
but Fascism itself, and that the crimes were committed both by individuals and 
organizations.21 Influential Soviet legal expert Professor Aron Trainin had already 
written about the need for the trial as a means of achieving the ‘moral and political 
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defeat of Fascism.”22 To this end, the format of the trial enabled a more sophisticated 
understanding of the machinery of Nazi crimes, and shifted attention onto criminal 
organizations. Trainin explained that it was not just a question of establishing the guilt 
of the major Nazis, but of the organizations that they lead, to enable national courts to 
prosecute those found guilty of membership of those organizations.23 In a memorable 
turn of phrase, Lev Sheinin argued the trial was analogous to a ‘pathological-
anatomical’ clinical process – an autopsy on the corpse of Fascism attempting to find 
out how it functioned, and the reasons for its behaviour. The verdict would also be a 
diagnosis.24 
Yet, while Soviet commentators were willing to look at the systematic nature of 
the Nazi crimes, if this meant humanizing the defendants excessively, then they were 
unwilling to do so, as, in contrast with the other Allied treatments there was a greater 
distance to the defendants. Whereas a number of English language publications 
included interviews with the accused, the Soviets condemned the practice.25 Writer 
Leonid Leonov in particular criticized the international press for their obsession with 
Göring, and their recounting details such as his staring at a female member of the 
court staff, when scribes should have been taking an interest in the documents26 
Vishnevskii was angered by a comment made by an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ neighbour, that 
Göring resembled Falstaff. He reacted, that despite his human failings, Falstaff was 
actually a human being: ‘But Göring, the creator of German concentration camps… is 
he human at all?’ For Vishnevskii, the answer is evidently, no.27 Leonov drew a 
different literary analogy, from Dostoevskii’s Crime and Punishment to stress the 
Nazis’ careful premeditation rather than irrational atavism: ‘the clarity of thought of 
the murderer is striking: I doubt even Raskolnikov thought through his murder of the 
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old woman so methodically.”28 For the Soviets, of course, Russian literature was a 
more appropriate frame of reference for understanding the Nazis than Shakespeare. 
The emphasis on the analysis of systems and organizations rather than individuals 
enabled the Soviets to highlight the role of the German army in carrying out Nazi 
policy, a connection the Western allies were reluctant to make.29 Indeed, they widely 
employ a translation of the Nazi term describing the invasion of the Soviet Union as a 
‘war of annihilation’ (Vernichtungskrieg; voina na unichtozhenie), with its obvious 
parallels with extermination camps (Vernichstungslager). This has only recently been 
widely adopted by Western historians to describe the Eastern front.30 Semen 
Krushinskii expanded, rejecting the distinction that Keitel made between the German 
military and German Fascism: he argued that the corpses left by Einsatzgruppen who 
accompanied the Army’s triumphant march across the Soviet Union are a clear 
illustration of this.31 
While Soviet journalists’ understandings of the Nazis evolved during the trial, they 
consistently viewed Nazism in such a way as to bolster the Soviet Union’s own 
importance. One way of doing this was by stressing the anti-Communist component 
in National Socialism, and the own Nazis’ use of the Bolshevik bugbear to distract 
democracies from their actions.32 Leonov distilled the Nazis’ racist and anti-
communist message to the German population: go to sleep and do not worry: ‘Our 
long-range artillery and SS angels in azure raiments will guard your slumber from the 
Mongolo-Slavic-Jewish designs of Moscow.”33 
Throughout the presentation of the US, British and French evidence, the Soviet 
press reworked material so as to stress the centrality of the Soviets’ own contribution 
and sacrifice in the war. One way of doing this was by the paratextual strategy of 
arranging material on the newspaper page, such as Pravda’s setting of Vsevolod 
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Vishnevskii’s November piece on Germany’s Anschluss with Austria, which makes 
no mention of the war on the Eastern front, alongside an article about operation 
Barbarossa by David Zaslavskii which included the word ‘Barbarossa’ prominently in 
its title.34 
Soviet writers also shifted focus onto the Soviet experience by emphasizing the 
fate of Soviet victims and drawing comparisons from their own prior experience or 
other stories reported in the Soviet media: Erenberg, when commenting upon the 
Americans’ detailed presentation of Nazi crimes, enumerates the earlier offences 
inflicted on the Soviets and exposed by the Soviet press as far back as 1942: 
Volokalamsk, Istra, Kerch.35 Vishnevskii recounts the witness testimony of those 
called by the French, such as Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier’s testimony about 
Auschwitz, but his article ends with these witnesses’ account of the crimes committed 
against Russian prisoners of war.36 Roman Karmen does something similar when 
reporting the crimes committed at Dachau, concentrating on the Soviets killed there, 
going through the records to list their names. Having been part of the team filming 
Majdanek in autumn 1944, Karmen commented that Dachau differed little from 
Majdanek or Auschwitz, and that it was an extermination camp.37 
Yet the most interesting and significant means whereby the Soviets insisted upon 
the centrality of their part in the war was through the supplementing of what was said 
or seen in the courthouse with personal memories summoned by the evidence. Thus, 
when watching footage of the American film, The Nazi Plan, Vishnevskii describes 
the terrible scenes these images stir, the evidence of Germany’s use of slave labour 
elicits Vishnevskii’s reflection upon the devastation and depopulation of the USSR, 
an evocation of the tears that lie behind the documents and causes Polevoi to address 
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an article to the woman he met in Khar´kov in 1943, entreating her to stop crying now 
that her tormentors were facing justice.38 
This sense of the Soviets as both the key participants and as crucial eyewitnesses 
was put forcefully by the leading article in Izvestiia on the day of the verdict: 
The Soviet people, that have borne on their shoulders the main weight of the war of 
liberation against Fascism, know the Fascists’ barbarous crimes not from hearsay 
accounts, and not from newspaper reports alone. With their own eyes Soviet people 
have seen the ruins of towns and the ashes of villages, with their own hands they have 
buried the corpses of those tortured and murdered.39 
The Soviet Journalist as Witness: Boris Polevoi 
The Nuremberg IMT deliberately played down the role of witnesses in favour of 
documents so as to establish a firm evidential base for the prosecution, and for the 
future historical record.40 This did little to enhance the drama and interest of the 
proceedings, and was one reason why they were often perceived as boring at the time. 
Leonov commented that time at Nuremberg was measured in the number of 
documents presented by the prosecution, and it provided ‘food solely for the mind but 
not the heart.”41  
A distinct feature of the Soviet journalists’ accounts of the trial is that they try to 
reinsert the personal and emotive dimension widely perceived to be lacking from 
proceedings, and they do so by drawing on their extensive experience of wartime 
reporting, recalling the victims of Nazism they had encountered earlier on in the 
conflict. In doing so they may be seen to mobilize an inherent possibility of the act of 
testimony that it involves the person listening to the testimony in the original 
traumatic experience.42 While Lyndsey Stonebridge refers to the public intellectuals 
who were at the Nuremberg IMT as ‘secondary witnesses to Nazi crimes,”43 the 
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Soviet journalists were witnesses of a more direct kind than this implies, having often 
been on the scene to see the immediate aftermath of Nazi atrocities earlier in the war, 
since 1941; most had seen far more sites of this kind, were closely related by 
language and culture to those whose fates and stories they witnessed, and 
consequently experienced a sense of co-owning the victims’ testimony to their 
traumatic experiences at the hands of the Nazis.44 This meant that Soviet journalists 
were able to supplement the often arid proceedings with corroborating and enriching 
supplementary accounts. Polevoi’s coverage of the trial is especially interesting in this 
respect, because he recalls his personal experience of Auschwitz: notably in an April 
1946 article, entitled ‘The Smoke of Auschwitz’, where he refers to his visit to the 
camp, a day he will never forget: ‘Auschwitz,’ stated Polevoi, ‘was the most 
monstrous of the Nazis’ creations.”45  
Few present at Nuremberg were able to grasp this fact, which has now become 
axiomatic to our understanding of the Holocaust.46 Polevoi, however, was alive to the 
meaning of testimony given at the trial by Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Franz 
Ferdinand Höss, and gave full credence to his boastful claims that Auschwitz was the 
place where the Nazis perfected the technology of destruction, because the Soviet 
journalist’s experience at Auschwitz meant he was better able than almost anyone at 
the trial to make the distinction between labour and extermination camps, even if his 
article from Nuremberg, quoted below, mentioned Auschwitz and Mauthausen in the 
same breath. Indeed, this was a separation of functions he claims to have grasped 
already in his diary account of the original visit first to Auschwitz, when the Polish 
railway man with whom he was billeted explained that it was in fact Birkenau where 
the extermination function was conducted.47  
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Yet Polevoi’s personal experience does not just sharpen his conceptual grasp as to 
the function of Auschwitz, it also adds an emotional tenor born from a sense of his 
being an eyewitness, of visiting Höss’ personal quarters, and of seeing the dying 
prisoners:  
 
I listen to the rustling of this calm and business-like voice [of Höss], and think what 
kind of system, environment, ideas there must be in which such monsters could be 
born, brought up and nurtured. I recalled the smoke of Auschwitz. I recalled its 
prisoners and their dying entreaties. And I wanted to say to those half-dead men in 
striped uniforms, who had been rescued from the fiery ovens by a miracle, that their 
murderer has not and will not escape punishment, and nor will all those who 
cultivated him, who directed his bloody hand who thought up all these Auschwitzes, 
Mauthausens, that there is no place for them on earth, there is none and will be 
none.48  
 
This ending of ‘The Smoke of Auschwitz’ echoed Polevoi’s original publication 
from February 1945, which concluded with praise for the Red Army, for liberating the 
camp. It was also preceded by precisely the same arresting image of the cadaverous 
survivors he encountered at Auschwitz:  
 
I saw those thousands of martyrs of Auschwitz – people exhausted to the point where 
they swayed like shadows in the wind, people whose age was impossible to guess.  
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The Red Army saved them, toree them from hell. They praise the Red Army that has 
wrought vengeance on the Fascist executioners for Auschwitz, for Majdanek, and for 
all the pain and suffering they have caused the peoples of Europe.49 
 
In comparing the two articles we sense an evolution: in Polevoi’s initial 
newspaper report he had stressed its provisional nature, the sense that his report 
would necessarily not be able to grasp the full picture, just as Simonov had at 
Majdanek, and the British and American reporters were later to do in the camps 
they discovered.50 We might note here that Polevoi does not mention the Jewish 
identity of the overwhelming majority of the camp’s victims.  
However, Polevoi’s original, unpublished 29 January 1945 report to herticulates 
asense the Army Political Directorate, who effectively exercised censorship, has now 
been released from the Russian Ministry of Defence archive to mark the 70th 
anniversary of Nazism as his description of the ‘conveyor of death’ shows:  
This was a long building, almost half a system. In both his article at the time, and 
that published at Nuremberg, the image of the camp’s inmates as a haunting presence 
dominates the conclusion, and it is these prisoners who are made to articulate its 
central message. A cynical attitude to Soviet propaganda might say that this exploits 
their image: the Soviets’ shrill emotional pitch contrasts with the prevailing, drily 
legal, tone of the Tribunal, yet it also harks back to the Moscow show trials, and both 
their hysteria and concomitant lack of concern for legal process.51 But while that is 
part of what is happening, the image of camp survivors also seems to be one that truly 
haunted Polevoi, making his report so poignant: it was his burden as a witness to life 
in the camp in the aftermath of liberation. This same combination of propagandist 
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motives and fresh first-hand experience was present in Soviet reporting of the Soviet 
prosecution case. 
The Soviet Prosecution 
Soviet coverage of the trial was initially extensive, with a leading article on the 
front page of Pravda on the day the indictment was announced, a further two pages 
detailing it, and a laconic TASS report on proceedings. Throughout the first months 
the Soviet press contained opinion pieces by author-journalists, sometimes as many as 
three or four on a single day. However, Soviet attention began to stray despite the 
efforts of reporters to inflect the other prosecution team’s presentations so as to 
underscore the Soviet perspective: Vishnevskii even claims that when chief 
prosecutor for the Soviet Union, Roman Rudenko spoke in December to counter 
efforts made by the defence, ‘even the American guards put their headphones on.”52 
As the Soviet press began to lose interest many reporters returned home at Christmas 
and the coverage began to dwindle to the telegraphic TASS summaries in January. 
This was interrupted on 9 February 1946, when once more there appeared a three and 
a half-page verbatim report in Pravda and Izvestiia, this time of Rudenko’s opening 
speech. 
The remaining Soviet journalists now made a renewed effort to stimulate interest 
in the trial, stressing the vital importance, and dramatic effect, of the Soviet evidence. 
This was the opportunity they had been waiting for to articulate the Soviet perspective 
on events. They did this first of all by heralding Rudenko as expressing the ‘voice of 
the Soviet people.”53 Polevoi argued that this intervention made the Soviet 




Although the court already possessed documents of extraordinary strength, until 
today, in the courtroom during the Soviet prosecutor’s speech, never yet had the 
image of Fascism unfolded before it with such breadth, the blood-drenched designs of 
Fascism had never yet been exposed before it so fully, and those present at the trial 
had never yet grasped with such strength of conviction the mortal danger from which 
the Red Army and our Soviet state had saved humanity.54 
 
The Soviet prosecution then presented evidence including its own films, including 
one of Nazi atrocities, and a series of witnesses to substantiate their narrative of the 
trial.  The Soviet journalists present made sure that the emotional power and 
underlying political message of this testimony was spelt out to their readers. 
The Soviet Witnesses 
Polevoi’s articles stressed the impact on the trial of the Soviet witnesses’ 
testimony, writing that: ‘their strength and significance made a profound 
impression.”55 The Soviet journalists certainly did their best to ensure that this would 
be the case, and spent considerable energies recounting the experience of these 
witnesses: Russian peasant Iakov Grigoriev, Academic Orbeli (director of the 
Hermitage museum in Leningrad, who was also a member of the Soviet war crimes 
commission), Evgenii Kivil´sha, a Ukrainian military doctor, Auschwitz eye-witness 
Severina Shmaglevskaia and survivor of the Vilnius ghetto, Abram Sutskever.56 
Nikolai Zhukov likewise drew portraits of these same witnesses. 
Each of these people had suffered personally at the hands of the Nazis, and 
consequently the effect was to heighten the emotional atmosphere. As Soviet 
journalist Semen Krushinskii put it, the words of these witnesses, such as 
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Smaglevskaia’s address to the accused: ‘where are our children?’ were not part of the 
legal process but nevertheless much needed simple and righteous words.57 
Along with intensifying the emotional pitch, the Soviets were also trying, in calling 
these witnesses, and especially Sutskever, to Sovietize the narrative of the trial, trying 
to do so by showing evidence of the crimes against the Jewish people, but presenting 
it in such a way as to emphasize the Soviets’ role in ending this suffering, and play 
down independent Jewish resistance.58 
Jewish Dimension 
In view of the Soviet Union’s later anti-Semitism, and near silence over the 
Holocaust, it may seem surprising that Soviet journalists such as Erenburg mentioned 
the figure of 6 million Jews killed by the Nazis and that both he and Vishnevskii refer 
to the Nazi description of this as the ‘solution of the Jewish question,’ a phrase here 
quoted by Vishnevskii as being used by Göring in a personal letter to architect of the 
Holocaust, Reinhard Heydrich.59 Yet, while the destruction of Europe’s Jews was 
reported by the Soviet press covering the trial, the harrowing account of Sutskever, 
one of only 600 Jews to have survived in Vilnius, from an original population of 
80,000, is retold so as to stress that he was helped to escape by Soviet partisans.60 
The same message is evident when Polevoi discusses Governor General of 
occupied Poland, Hans Frank’s diary, mentioning Jews far less, but once again ending 
with emphasis on the fact that it was the Red Army, with the help of the United 
Nations, that saved the world from the likes of Frank.61  
When, Polevoi wrote a piece about the Stroop report on the destruction of the 
Warsaw ghetto, which he incorrectly entitles the ‘Stumpf’ report, and describes the 
annihilation of the Warsaw ghetto in terrifying detail, describing the showing of 
photographs from the report, and the Nazis’ own film made of the destruction of the 
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ghetto. He makes no attempt to dissemble the Jews’ fate.62 However, Polevoi’s 
account is completely silent as to the 1943 Warsaw ghetto uprising: the Jews are not 
said to have resisted, but rather to have attempted to escape, or to have preferred death 
in the flames to death at the hands of the Nazis. The ghetto uprising, as an 
independent Jewish initiative that bore no relation to the Red Army, and did not cast 
the Soviet Union as the key agent of Nazi defeat, was evidently not worth mentioning 
for Polevoi. 
Subsequently, Polevoi further ‘sovietized’ this evidence in his memoirs by moving 
the description of the Stroop report (now spelled correctly) to Soviet prosecutor 
Smirnov’s evidence, and the opening of the Soviet prosecution, giving Smirnov some 
of the lines describing the elegantly bound volume that he used in the newspaper 
article in December 1945.63 The effect of this rewriting of history is to undo some of 
the scene stealing by the Americans during the trial, by placing the evidence back in 
Soviet hands. 
The Soviet Films 
A further tool the Soviet team used to convey a sense of their own narrative of the 
war was the screening of films compiled from Soviet newsreel footage of the 
aftermath of Nazi occupation. Strangely, however, these films attracted less attention, 
even from Soviet journalists than the earlier footage shown by the US prosecution, 
which had a sensational and much discussed impact. The problem seems to have 
been that by the time the Soviet films were shown, most of the Soviet journalists 
had lost interest in the trial, and there were few reports about it in the Soviet press. 
Indeed, the same is true of their coverage of the Soviet prosecution’s production of 
star witness Field Marshall Von Paulus, who had surrendered to the Red Army at 
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Stalingrada, an event that is treated in many accounts as the highpoint of the Soviet 
case, but that was not covered in Pravda or Izvestiia at the time.64 
Izvestiia’s report on the main film shown by the Soviets, Film Documents of 
Atrocities Committed by the German-Fascist Invaders (Kinodukumenty o zverstvakh 
nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov) written by Roman Karmen, who had a hand in 
making the film itself, tended to rehash the film’s content. However, it also stressed 
the Soviets’ role in pushing for the trial, in collating film evidence since 1941, and in 
fulfilling their ‘great mission of liberation”.65 While the gruesome film with its 
catalogue of corpses, whom Karmen describes as ‘mute witnesses’, does not itself 
directly articulate this message of the Soviet role, its timeframe, geographical 
emphasis, and the very fact that it was made and shown by the Soviets, all draw 
attention to their role in the trial.66 The conviction that this film footage too was a 
form of witness testimony was one deeply held by Karmen, who had not only 
overseen its compilation but also filmed some of the footage.  
Echoing descriptions of the films screened by the US prosecution, which 
concentrated on the shocked reactions of the defendants, Karmen claims that the 
Soviet film distressed them more than at any previous point in the proceedings, and 
turned their faces pale with fear. This is corroborated by Ann and John Tusa’s history 
of the trial: ‘The film surpassed in horror anything yet shown, anything envisaged 
from the evidence which had yet been heard.”67 
In addition to Film Documents of Atrocities…, the Soviets showed a number of 
films at the trial, including a captured German film showing the destruction of the 
Czech town of Lidice, which Krushinskii describes, but the emphasis is upon the 
suffering inflicted by the Nazis upon the Soviet people, and the attempted destruction 
of the Russian nation in particular. This is the underlying message of the Soviet film 
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showing Nazi destruction of sites of cultural value in the USSR, and another one 
recording the destruction of Soviet towns. Krushinskii comments that, for all its 
importance, such film ‘is only able to represent the full extent of the Nazis’ crimes in 
the way that a test-tube full of sea water represents the sea.”68 Yet while a case can be 
made for the importance of these Soviet films, they failed to attract the attention the 
films shown by the US did.69 
The Evolving Political Situation 
Despite the impression created by Soviet journalists, the Soviet prosecution did not 
have much of an effect on a trial that was already regarded as at best tedious and at 
worst irrelevant, both in the USSR and beyond. Tensions between the United Nations 
outside the courtroom were rising. Throughout the trial, Soviet journalists made 
noises complaining about the toleration of Nazi sympathizers in Britain, where 
Oswald Mosley was said to be on the march again, about former Nazis being still at 
liberty to sell pro-Nazi literature in British-controlled West Germany and about the 
fact that the remnants of the German Army were under British jurisdiction in 
Schleswig-Holstein.70 
The implication was that Britain as a whole had pro-Hitler sympathies, and that the 
only true opponents of the Nazis were the Soviets. In a variation on this theme, 
Vishnevskii argued the defence interventions were an attempt to use the tribunal as a 
forum to inspire wider Fascist views, and cites examples of these expressed in 
Britain.71 
The simmering hostility boiled over when Winston Churchill made his 5 March 
1946 speech, in Fulton, Missouri, where he condemned the Soviet Union’s crushing 
of democracy in Eastern Europe.72 The front-page Pravda editorial described this as 
nothing other than the ‘liquidation’ of the United Nations.73 Later that year Pravda 
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published an article entitled ‘The Kiss of Goebbels’ written by David Zaslavskii, 
which argued that Churchill’s Fulton speech was inspired by Goebbels.74 The Cold 
War adversaries were beginning to see each other as similar to the Nazis. 
If the participants did not previously understand that the Cold War was breaking 
out, then they began to now. With the Soviet Union realizing that it had effectively 
been outmanoeuvred in legal, diplomatic and propaganda terms, and therefore had 
little to gain from the trial any more, the journalistic coverage was allowed to dwindle 
to a minimum, with almost no cartoons, and very few authored articles, including 
none at all in May and June. Polevoi began devoting his energies to the writing of a 
novel The Story of a True Man, which even took him back to Moscow for several 
months in spring.75 
Only towards the very end of the trial did it become newsworthy once more, as in 
August, after an absence of anything other than TASS reports for months, the Soviet 
press published a lengthy verbatim report of chief prosecutor for the USSR, 
Rudenko’s closing speech, covering most of a folio page.76 There was further 
coverage at the end of August and beginning of September, concentrating on 
Rudenko’s speeches, and on the day of the verdict, there was a leader and the 
verbatim reproduction of it, followed by, on 5th October, a lengthy condemnation of 
the judgment, criticizing the innocent verdict on Papen, Schacht and Frickk, and also 
on the imprisonment and not death sentence handed to Hess.77  
The Cold War mood was signalled by the Izvestiia leader on the day of the verdict, 
which argued that the defence and defendants were aided by their supporters in the 
Vatican and the Hearst media empire.78 Inside the Soviet Union, the final moments of 
the trial were accompanied by the ideological retrenchment led by Andrei Zhdanov 
and many of its targets related to the themes raised at Nuremberg. First of all, in 
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August, prominent journals (Zvezda) and writers (Mikhail Zoshchenko and Anna 
Akhmatova) associated with Leningrad were criticized, implicitly for their 
independence of mind and their city’s independence of action during the war. Then in 
September a film A Great Life [Bol´shaia zhizn´] part 2 was criticized for its 
unacceptably frank depiction of the occupation.79 The ambiguities and deviations 
from the Stalinist norm during the war were now becoming a major source of 
embarrassment, and since the trial necessarily touched upon them, as well as showing 
the erstwhile Western allies in a good light, and unacceptably highlighting the fate of 
the Jews, it was becoming an ever more unwelcome and sensitive subject. The war 
was now to be remembered primarily as a glorious, unproblematic, overwhelmingly 
Soviet victory. Writers, journalists or filmmakers unable to articulate that vision 
adequately were to be censured. 
Conclusion 
The Soviet press coverage at Nuremberg attempted to present the proceedings in 
such a way as to highlight Soviet wartime losses, their part in the victory and their 
role as arbiters of the post-war order. However, the way in which Soviet reports of the 
trial ebbed away into near silence seems to corroborate accounts of the Soviets’ 
participation in the trial as a failure. Hirsch sees Soviet failures as linked to the 
centralized nature of their propaganda and as a consequence of being institutionally 
and politically outmaneuvered.80 
While it is hard to dispute that the Soviets were outmanoeuvred, or that their 
propaganda system’s overall centralization was a hindrance, when we look at 
particular themes, such as the depiction of the Nazis, or particular journalists’ 
reworking of material they had already covered, such as Polevoi on Auschwitz, we 
see an illuminating picture of someone grappling with the problem of fitting hisould 
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could own experiences and thoughts into the emerging template for representation of 
the trial. 
The result is that, while the Soviet reporting all servedd centralized propagandist 
aims, at its best, it combinedd this overarching purpose with a poignant tone of 
emotional immediacy, with the candour of the reporters’ personal experiences and 
eyewitness accounts to the worst of the Nazi atrocities. Given that the trial more 
broadly side-lined witnesses in favour of documents, the Soviet accounts may be said 
to add something of a corrective to the dull prevailing course of the tribunal. These 
personal memories were the main reason why, in some instances the Soviets 
anticipated modern views on the importance of Auschwitz as a site of the Holocaust, 
and on the nature of the Wehrmacht’s complicity in the ‘war of annihilation’ and 
hence the Holocaust in the USSR.  
But it is also true that the Soviets’ failure to convey their narrative convincingly to 
the wider world, especially the Western powers present at Nuremberg, was due to the 
difficulties Soviet propaganda faced in adapting its domestic methods to the 
international sphere: what worked in the USSR did not work so well at Nuremberg.81 
While the focus of this chapter has been Soviet journalism aimed at a domestic 
readership, it is evident that even in attempting to make the trial corroborate the 
emerging Soviet narrative of the war to this constituency there were problems, since 
the trial’s Western and American bias was hard to redress. This challenge for Soviet 
journalists at Nuremberg pointed to the wider problem for the Soviets in the post-war 
period, where their stressing of the price paid by the Soviets for victory was not 
properly recognized abroad, and Nuremberg was one of the first indications of the 
Soviets’ impending defeat in the Cold War battle over the memory of World War 
Two. Indeed, Geoffrey Roberts argues that one of the factors driving the anti-Western 
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campaign and the initial stages of the Cold War was genuine indignation from Stalin 
that the West did not recognize sufficiently the Soviet contribution to the war with 
concrete diplomatic concessions.82 
Ultimately, however, the trial itself was addressed, as Polevoi surmised, not to 
contemporaries, but to posterity.83 If this is so, then we can productively revisit it and 
decide for ourselves what evidence, which documents and what testimony was the 
most important. By doing so I believe we shall increasingly decide that the Soviet 
evidence and media presence has been undervalued. 
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